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show that: (a) a low probability of detection with high fine reduces both the amount and the
likelihood of bribe demand, (b) a high probability of detection with low fine has no effect on
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“[…]it is efficient to hang offenders with probability zero.”
-

S.C. Kolm, 1973

1. Introduction
Ashoka, the emperor who once ruled ancient India, propagated among his subjects the idea of
Dhamma (loosely translated as righteous or moral life), through a series of edicts inscribed on
stone pillars. After having laid out the demands of Dhamma, the great monarch surmised that
though regulation and persuasion were two means available for its promotion, it was persuasion
which was more effective. Despite having the entire state machinery at his disposal, Ashoka
thought a change of heart through persuasion had a far greater effect than regulation.
In this paper, we evaluate the efficacy of regulation and persuasion when it comes to moral
decision making (e.g. whether to engage in corruption or not), i.e., we ask if extrinsic
(dis)incentive induced by a regulatory framework is more successful in dissuading people from
making immoral choices, or if inducing a higher intrinsic moral cost is more effective. In other
words, we investigate whether Ashoka was indeed right in his surmise; some 2400 years later.
The focus of economic theories that study different aspects of corruption has been on
comparing the private returns to corruption versus honesty. From this “rational” vantage point,
the overarching objective has been to design institutions which offer a credible disincentive to
corruption by suitably altering the two principal anti-corruption policy levers, namely,
probability of audit and penalty or fine (Becker and Stigler,1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1975). These
two policy levers have remained the bulwark of anti-corruption mechanisms since then.1 The
idea that intrinsic motivation (i.e., the moral cost associated with the shame and guilt of making
unethical choices) may serve as a prominent corruption restraining trait has emerged in the
literature rather recently. Cultural anthropologists and sociologists have proposed that a change
1

That is not to say that alternative policies have not been examined or tested. For instance, Basu (2011) proposed
and Abbink et al. (2014) examined asymmetric liability for the suppliers and recipients of corrupt practices, Ryvkin
and Serra (2012) analyzed the effects of staff rotation, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) proposed competition among
public officials.
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in the “value system” be made as opposed to the “incentive system”, to make a significant dent
into corruption (Bardhan, 2006). According to this view, education and awareness campaigns
alongside a strong social disapproval mechanism are effective measures that help change the
value system. Notice, this is “persuasion” in the sense Ashoka used the term.
We investigate the fault line between “rational” extrinsic incentive driven approach and
intrinsic moral cost driven approach, using a laboratory corruption experiment. In particular, we
aim to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches with the help of a
harassment bribery game. Within that overarching objective, we also investigate which of the
two policy levers, probability of detection and fine, has a stronger bite in terms of reducing
corruption. Thus, in addition to analyzing non-monetary and monetary disincentives to
corruption, our study contrasts the alternative mechanisms within the monetary disincentive
framework.
We take an experimental route to study the effects and the deeper mechanisms driving
corrupt behavior. Our methodological choice of using laboratory based experimental tools for
investigating these questions is guided in part by the complexity of the questions, nature of the
outcome of interest (namely, corruption), and recent methodological advances made in the
context of laboratory corruption games. First, identification of the effects of either monetary or
non-monetary interventions using observational data is difficult because of endogeneity related
issues. Any such attempt will likely give us at best correlational, not causal, results. Second,
corruption is a clandestine activity and may not be measured without measurement errors. And
third, studies show that results obtained through laboratory experiments, particularly laboratory
corruption games, are externally valid and they do measure moral cost of engaging in corruption
(Armantier and Boly, 2013; Banerjee, 2016).
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We conduct two experiments – one each to study monetary and non-monetary disincentives
to corruption. Both experiments share the same canonical harassment bribery game.2 In the
bribery game, a “Citizen” (C, hereafter) performs a real effort task. If successful, the C is entitled
to a prize, subject to a procedural approval from a “Public Official” (PO, hereafter). However,
the PO may demand a bribe from the C to approve of the prize.3 The C can either (a) accept the
bribe demand, in which case she earns the prize less the bribe, and the PO earns his salary plus
the bribe, or (b) reject the bribe demand, in which case both individuals earn their basic payoffs.
In this baseline treatment, the bribery game does not have any anti-corruption mechanism.
Experiment 1 introduces two treatments with different anti-corruption mechanisms. In the
first treatment, the players engage in the same bribery game as before, however, there is a small
probability that the PO is audited. If the audit finds him accepting bribe, he pays a heavy fine. On
the other hand, in the second treatment, there is a high probability that the PO is audited.
However, if the audit finds him accepting a bribe, he pays a small fine. The two treatments are so
designed that the PO’s expected payoff at each bribe demand level stays constant.
The two audit treatments offer us a novel setting where Becker’s (1968) classic prediction –
for risk averse individuals, quantum of fine serves more of a deterrent than an equivalent
increase in chances of being caught – can be tested. There is a further policy-relevant, critically
important reason to examine which of the two strategies is more effective. Clearly, if the two
strategies are costless, a planner will choose the maximum value for both the policy levers.
However, in practice, increasing the probability of detecting corruption is costly, e.g., the

2

A harassment bribery game, as opposed to games based on collusive bribery, simulates a situation where a
government official can potentially extort bribe from a citizen for a service the citizen is naturally entitled to, e.g.,
obtaining a driving license after having passed the driving test. Past studies such as Abbink et al. (2014)
and Banerjee (2016) have used different versions of laboratory based harassment bribery games.
3

From now on we will treat the PO as male and the Citizen as female.
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government needs a larger number of vigilance officers, increased capability of existing anticorruption personnel, and a large, swift and effective judiciary. Increasing fine too is expensive:
first, an increase in fine raises the cost of getting a conviction, and second, increasing fine in the
statutes involves significant political costs. As a result, a planner faces a trade-off (in terms of
cost) between probability of detection and fine. Consequently, the efficacy of these two
alternative strategies becomes the decisive question.
Results from Experiment 1 suggest that low probability of detection and high fine
significantly reduces both the amount and the likelihood of bribe demand, but high probability of
detection and low fine has no effect on either. In other words, a high fine offers a stronger
deterrence to bribe demanding behavior than a high probability of detection at the same expected
payoff level.
We design a second experiment aimed at raising the moral cost or intrinsic disincentive for
the unethical act of demanding bribe. Many business schools across the globe teach courses on
ethics – the aim supposedly is to change one’s perception of the moral (in)appropriateness of an
action. We test the efficacy of one such ethics teaching module with bribe demanding behavior
as an outcome variable of interest. In the baseline treatment of Experiment 2, the same
harassment bribery game is implemented, without subjects having been through the ethics
education. In Treatment 1, subjects participate in a four-week ethics module and in the fifth week
they participate in the laboratory based harassment bribery game. In Treatment 2, subjects
participate in the same four week ethics module, but play the bribery game only in the eighth
week. Thus, the experimental treatments vary whether a subject goes through the ethics module
or not and when the outcome of interest, namely unethical behavior as measured through the
bribery game, is observed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first carefully crafted
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experimental design that attempts to evaluate whether ethics education is effective, and it also
helps us identify whether such effects, if any, hold longitudinally.
In an influential review paper, Abbink and Serra (2012) discuss the role of framing effects
and externalities in reducing corruption, in the context of nonmonetary incentives and intrinsic
motivations as anticorruption tools. Perhaps, their attempt can be construed as the first logical
step in the formation of hither to thin experimental corruption literature on non-monetary
interventions. The next pivotal question is: can behavioral change be induced by normative
appeals, such as ethics courses? The relevance of evaluating the impact ethics courses may
potentially have on curbing corruption cannot be overstated in today’s world. Firstly, ethics is
taught at the school level as moral science in many parts of the world. Secondly, in the recent
past ethics has been introduced as a compulsory subject in a wide range of professional courses
(such as Masters in Business Administration). The genesis of such introduction can be traced
back to the gross unethical conduct in accounting scandals in Enron in 2001, financial crisis in
2008, and more recently, LIBOR rate fixing episode which involved a slew of international
banks. As Beyond Grey Stripes reported in 2011, the number of MBA programs which had a
compulsory ethics course increased from 34% to 79%, the aim of which presumably was moral
transformation.4 Whether or not such courses induce the desired goals is still an open question.
Results from Experiment 2 indicate that normative appeals of ethics education act in ways
that are very different from extrinsic disincentive driven approaches. First, ethics education did
not have any effect on the amount of bribe demand either in Treatment 1 or Treatment 2. Second,
it did have an effect on the likelihood of bribe demand in Treatment 1, but not in Treatment 2.
These results indicate that any effect ethics education may have had on the decision to engage in
4

In a related but distinct literature, it has been shown that studying economics makes people more selfish (rational,
if you will) (List et al., 2001; Frey and Meier, 2003; Haucap and Müller, 2014), and care less about fairness, more
about efficiency (Fehr, Naef and Schmidt, 2006; Faravelli, 2007).
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bribery (or not) is short-lived and does not survive beyond the fourth week. The results also
suggest that the underlying mechanism through which normative appeals work is very different
from the mechanism through which monetary disincentives function.
The two experiments are conducted with different subject pools. As such, a direct
comparison of the treatment effects may not be too meaningful. However, Experiments 1 and 2
share the same baseline treatment – treatments are then introduced within each experiment. This
allows us to measure the treatment effects relative to the respective baseline results within each
experiment. Besides, the identical underlying structure in both the experiments allows us to pin
down the behavioral channels through which monetary and non-monetary interventions work.
Our treatment effects, when normalized relative to the baseline, indicate that not only does ethics
education not have any statistically significant effect on bribe amount, the relative effect that it
has on the likelihood of bribe demand is quantitatively smaller than that in low probability of
audit with high fine. We also document that extrinsic incentive driven monetary interventions
create perverse effects owing to strategic considerations unlike non-monetary interventions.
Overall, in our setting, regulation has been more effective in reducing bribe demand than
persuasion through normative appeals.5
Our contributions to the literature are several. First, in view of the fact that monetary and
non-monetary interventions are hard to compare in observational settings, we provide a credible
experimental structure using which the issue can be studied. Second, we study the relative
effectiveness of the fine amount and the probability of audit in curbing unethical conduct – our
novel approach keeps the expected payoff under the two parameter configurations the same and
5

We acknowledge that since normative appeal (intrinsic motive) is not quantifiable, it is difficult to formulate an
appropriate ethics education module that is exactly equivalent to a (quantifiable) monetary disincentive (extrinsic
motive) based mechanism in terms of curbing corruption. As such, an insightful discussion on the relative
comparison between the effectiveness of the ethics module and the effectiveness of the audit treatments is beyond
the scope of this paper.
7

thus, allows us to test an important implication of the Beckerian paradigm of studying corruption
that postulates that the effects of the two policy instruments are asymmetric. Third, we use
beliefs about others’ behavior to delineate the deeper psychological mechanisms at work when it
comes to efficacy of different anti-corruption tools. Fourth, our study examines not only the very
short run instantaneous effect of normative appeals on corruption, but also the intermediate effect
after a significant passage of time.
The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section 2 offers an overview of the
literature, Section 3 lays down a set of clearly defined hypotheses that may be tested using our
experimental data, Section 4 lays out the experimental design and results from Experiment 1,
Sections 5 present the experimental design and results from Experiment 2. Section 6 compares
the results from the two experiments, offers policy recommendations, and Section 7 concludes.

2. Overview of the Literature
The effects of the two instruments, probability of detection and penalty (or fine), have been
independently studied in quite a few contexts. In the tax compliance literature, studies show a
small but significant deterring effect of an increase in detection probability (Slemrod et al.,
2001), but no effect of an increase the associated fine (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann,
1996; Torgler 2005). A survey paper by Fischer et al. (1992) concludes that tax compliance
increases with probability of audit or detection. The nature of the collected data in these studies
is often controversial and potential endogeneity issues are many. Besides, only a few studies deal
with changing both fine and probability of audit at the same time – while Alm et al. (1992) find
tax compliance increases with audit rates more than it does with fine rates, Park and Hyun
(2003)’s findings are opposite. However, even the last two studies do not change the probability
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and fine parameters in a manner such that the expected payoff is unchanged, thus making
comparisons difficult.
In the context of criminal behavior, it is generally agreed that increases in probability of
detection and fine reduce crime (Eide, 2000). This literature concludes that in terms of
magnitude, certainty of punishment is a stronger deterrent to crime than severity of punishment.
However, many of these studies rely on self-reported data collected from individuals with
criminal history (see e.g. Grogger, 1991). Other contexts that address similar questions include
Stafford (2002), who estimates the impact of an increase in fines on hazardous waste violations;
and Shimshack and Ward (2005), who analyze the effect of past fines and frequency of
inspection on water pollution.
Two papers attempt to change the probability and amount, for the same level of expected
payoff and both take the experimental route. In the gain domain, Bruner (2009) studies the effect
of changes in probability of winning rewards in a context free lottery and changes in reward
amount, keeping the expected payoff the same. His finding that people prefer an increase in
probability to an increase in reward for the same expected value is consistent with predictions
from expected utility theory. In the loss domain, Friesen (2012) finds that severity of punishment
is a stronger deterrent than certainty of punishment, when it comes to the issue of compliance.
Though strategies to combat corruption has taken the center stage of discussions in many
national and international fora, there is surprisingly little evidence regarding the efficacies of the
two principal policy levers, namely, probability of detection and fine.
In the context of efficacy of teaching ethics, Konow (2014) evaluates the impact of
philosophy class on fairness views and of studying business ethics on generosity and
cooperation. However, it is hard to argue that an un-generous or non-cooperative behavior is also
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unethical, which perhaps leads to a disconnect between the topic of lecture and the outcome of
interest. Waples et al. (2009) conduct a meta-analysis that shows there is, if any, a minimal
impact of ethics courses on outcomes. In a related study, Antes et al. (2010) find that a course on
responsible conduct of research has little impact on actual ethical decisions scientists take. The
limitations of these studies lie in their outcome measures, which are attitudinal and not
behavioral. In our study, we measure a behavioral outcome, which is precisely what the imparted
ethics education aims to address, namely, unethical conduct. Once again, despite normative
appeals being widely invoked in popular discourse to engender honest behavior among common
people, civil servants or politicians, there has been no systematic study that analyzes the impact
of such appeals on corruption.
Our main outcome of interest is corruption behavior, which is essentially clandestine in
nature and therefore, difficult to measure. Luckily a large experimental literature has evolved
which suggests that corruption behavior may be credibly measured through lab based
experimental games (see Abbink and Serra (2012) for a review). Our ability to observe
corruption in a controlled environment gives us a nice set up in which anti-corruption policies
may be tested. Some extant studies have creatively used such games to study anti-corruption
policies. For instance, Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) introduce exogenously determined
“sudden death” in their bribery game and find that a small threat to disqualification is a strong
deterrent; a finding also observed in Berninghaus (2012). On the other hand, Schulze and Frank
(2003) do not find any effect of introducing fine on corruption. The apparent contradiction
between the two studies has been explained by differences in experimental protocol, payment
rule etc. Interestingly, the two studies differ in one crucial aspect, which has been largely ignored
by the literature - Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) implement higher penalties and Schulze
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and Frank (2003) higher probability of detection. Our paper can potentially throw a light on this
difference in parametrization as a reason for divergence in the results – we discuss this aspect in
Section 7. Although some studies focus on social appropriateness norm violation (Banerjee,
2016) and externality as forms of non-monetary disincentive to corruption (Abbink et al., 2002;
Barr and Serra, 2009) and others study the effectiveness of social observability on corruption
(Salmon and Serra, 2016), none of them compare the relative effectiveness of extrinsic and
intrinsic disincentives to corrupt behavior. One recent exception is Cason et al. (2016), who
compare compliance behavior in the presence of formal regulatory framework with fine and
informal mechanisms such as information observability. They find that social observability has
no effect on misreporting behavior. Social observability is one important form of non-monetary
channel. Our paper studies normative appeal as a form of non-monetary intervention. In doing
so, we contribute precisely at the intersection of the monetary and non-monetary interventions,
by analysing their relative effectiveness in the context of a standard harassment bribery game.

3. Hypotheses
According to Becker, an agent who decides whether to commit a crime (corruption, in our case),
essentially compares the benefits of committing versus not committing the crime. In our
framework, the PO decides whether to demand bribe or not. The expected utility of not
demanding a bribe is given by
𝐸𝑈(ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦) = 𝑈(𝑤),
where 𝑤 is the wage he receives.6 The expected utility of obtaining a bribe is given by
𝐸𝑈(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝑝𝑈(𝑤 − 𝐹(𝑏)) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑈(𝑤 + 𝑏) − 𝑚(𝑏)

6

(1),

Since the PO’s payoff from honesty does not involve any uncertainty, this is actually a payoff with certainty.
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where 𝑝 is the probability of audit, 𝑏 is the bribe amount, 𝐹(𝑏) is the fine if audited (𝐹 ′ (𝑏) > 0),
and 𝑚(𝑏) is the intrinsic moral cost of demanding the bribe.7 In Experiment 1, the moral cost
component remains unchanged, while we manipulate 𝑝 and 𝐹 to change the expected utility from
engaging in corruption. On the other hand, our main objective in Experiment 2 is to influence
expected utility by changing 𝑚(𝑏) through ethics education.
Experiment 1 is based on two anticorruption policy levers, namely probability of audit (𝑝),
and quantum of fine (𝐹). Introduction of 𝑝 and 𝐹 in itself reduces the expected utility of a (risk
averse) PO and therefore acts as a deterrent. Such an environment will be characterized by the
following two features: one, a rational C will expect less number of POs to demand bribe and
two, if fine is monotonically related to bribe amount demanded, then the predictions for the
proportion of the POs demanding bribe will also extend to the amount of bribe demanded. This
leads us to the first set of empirically testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1A: The proportion of corrupt POs and the amount of bribe demanded are higher in
an environment where there is no chance of detection than one in which there is a chance of an
audit and associated fine.
Hypothesis 1B: The proportion of Citizens who believe a bribe will be demanded and the
expected bribe amount are higher in an environment where there is no chance of detection than
one in which there is a chance of an audit and associated fine.
Expected utility framework gives us some more interesting predictions: If the expected
payoff remains unchanged, a (bribe demanding) risk averse PO prefers high probability of
detection and low fine over low probability of detection and high fine. Appendix 1 lays out the
theoretical framework for the prediction, and Figure A1.1 illustrates the same8. A corollary of

7

Strictly speaking, the utility functions are indirect utility functions, which are often denoted by 𝑉(∙).
It is important to emphasize that the expected utility framework discussed above is based on just that: expected
utility. A mathematical model for the framework is given in Appendix 1. The model shows that, for a given bribe
demand and fixed expected payoff, a risk averse PO will derive higher expected utility under a policy of high
probability of detection with low fine than under a policy of low probability of detection with high fine. However,
the model does not accommodate the situation in which the PO considers the game as an expected utility
8
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that prediction is that the two enforcement systems are equally effective for risk neutral
individuals. Consequently, a rational Citizen will expect low probability of detection with high
fine to have a higher bite in terms of reducing corruption than high probability of detection with
low fine. A Citizen will also prefer to accept a higher bribe demand in the presence of audit and
asymmetric liability i.e. if she is not liable to penalty but the PO is. This gives us a second set of
testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2A: The proportion of POs who demand bribe and the bribe amount are higher in an
environment with high probability of detection and low fine, than in an environment with low
probability of detection and high fine, at the same level of expected payoff.
Hypothesis 2B: The proportion of Citizens who expect POs to demand bribe and the expected
bribe amount are higher in an environment with high probability of detection and low fine, than
in an environment with low probability of detection and high fine, at the same level of expected
payoff.
Hypothesis 2C: The maximum bribe acceptable to Citizens will be higher in the audit treatments
than that in the control treatment.
In Experiment 2, we aim to change the incidence of bribe demand by altering the moral cost
of engaging in corruption, 𝑚(𝑏), by introducing ethics education. An ethics education is
expected to increase the moral cost and thereby lower the expected utility from demanding bribe.
We expect a lower bribe demand due to an increase in the intrinsic cost of demanding bribe.
However, the effect of the ethics education may not remain unchanged with passage of time. In
particular, we may expect that the mitigating effect of ethics education on corruption may taper
(or even disappear) with time. Finally, so far as the relative effectiveness of intrinsic versus
extrinsic cost of engaging in corruption is concerned, economic theory does not tell us anything

maximization exercise with respect to 𝑏. In such a situation, the policy maker may be interested in assessing how 𝑏 ∗
will vary across the two policies. Such a situation can be captured by a more complicated model but it is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, even in this model, it can be shown (under reasonable conditions) that a policy of low
probability of detection with high fine will have a stronger bite on 𝑏 ∗ , than a policy of high probability of detection
with low fine.
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about this. That, after all, is an empirical question. Thus, we have the next set of empirically
testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3A: The proportion of POs who demand a bribe and the bribe demand are lower for
the subjects who go through ethics education than for those who do not go through ethics
education.
Hypothesis 3B: The immediate effect of ethics education on POs’ bribe demand behavior is
greater than the longer run effect.
Hypothesis 3C: The proportion of Citizens who accept bribe are lower for the subjects who go
through ethics education than for those who do not go through ethics education. The immediate
effect of ethics education on Citizens’ acceptance behavior is greater than the long run effect.
Hypothesis 3D: The effect of ethics education or intrinsic motivation on POs bribe demand
behavior, relative to the control, may be higher or lower or equal to the effect of extrinsic
motivation oriented policies such as introducing probability of detection and fine.
We also expect that the Cs’ beliefs will be consistent with the POs’ actual decisions. The next
section lays out the experimental design that allows us to test the above hypotheses.
4. Experiment 1
Each treatment in Experiment 1 comprises of multiple stages. We begin by describing Stage
1 that is common to all treatments. The subsections will then focus on the other stages that are
specific to a given treatment.
In Stage 1 of each treatment, a C is randomly matched with a PO, and they play a one-shot
game.9 The Cs and the POs are located in two different rooms. Each C is paid a basic fee of 400
Mohor for performing a task, and each PO is paid a salary of 1000 Mohor (M, hereafter) for
grading the task and (potentially) approving the prize.10 The rules of the game, the set of
strategies and the payoff function for each player are common knowledge to both players.

9

We describe the experimental treatments from the perspective of a randomly matched representative pair that
includes a C and a PO. The tasks of all other matched pairs are identical to the tasks of the representative pair.
The experimental currency is termed as “Mohor”. The conversion rate between Mohor and Indian Rupee (INR) is
set at 1M = 0.4 INR. Therefore, the basic fee (salary) for a C (PO) is 160 INR (~ 9.41 PPP USD). In PPP terms, 1
US Dollar = 17 INR (source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPP).
10
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To start with, the C is asked to perform a simple task to qualify for a prize of 600M (over and
above the basic fee of 400M). The experimenter provides each C with five sequences of letters
on a piece of paper. The task requires each C to correctly indicate within seven minutes the
number of times the letter “A” occurs in each sequence.11 If a C correctly solves at least three of
the sequences, then she is entitled to the prize. The experimenter provides the correct answers to
the matched PO, who then determines whether the C has qualified for the prize by providing at
least three (out of five) correct answers. In addition, the experimenter announces the correct
answers in the Cs’ room. Given the simplicity of the task, each C is expected to get at least three
answers correct, and thereby form a sense of entitlement to the prize.12

4.1 Control Treatment
Figure 1 depicts the Control Treatment. After Stage 1, subjects proceed to Stage 2, which
begins when the PO determines whether the C has won the prize. Following that determination,
the PO chooses any one of four possible strategies: approve the prize, demand a bribe of 200M,
or 400M, or 600M in return for approving the prize. While the PO chooses his strategy, the C
simultaneously and independently decides whether to accept or reject each possible bribe
demand the PO might opt for. Stated differently, the experiment employs the strategy method,
wherein the C indicates any one of two possible strategies (‘accept’ or ‘reject’) for each possible
bribe demand. Once the decisions are made, each player turns in the decision sheet to the
experimenter.
[Figure 1 here]
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A typical sequence is: AEACBCBCCAEEAABBADEADDEADEADB.
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It turned out that each of 114 Citizens, who participated in the experiments, provided at least three correct
answers. However, it was important that the citizens “earned” the prize rather than being endowed with it – this
approach helped in engendering the sense of entitlement and subsequently a sense of harassment, if and when bribe
is demanded.
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The final payoffs from the game are determined by matching the two players’ decisions. If
the PO approves, both players earn 1000M (PO earns salary (= 𝑤), and C earns prize plus basic
fee). On the contrary, if the PO demands a bribe 𝑏 ∈ {200M, 400M, 600M}, two possibilities
emerge: the C accepts, in which case she earns (1000M − 𝑏) and the PO earns (1000M + 𝑏); or
the C rejects, in which case (the transaction does not take place and) she earns 400M and the PO
earns 1000M. Since the base earning of the PO is at least as large as that of the C, it ensures that
bribe demand cannot be explained by other behavioral channels such as inequity aversion.
In addition to their decisions, the C and the PO respond to a set of questions related to their
beliefs about what strategy their matched partner is likely to take. In particular, the C reports her
expectation of whether the PO will demand bribe, and the PO reports his expectation of whether
the C will accept a bribe demand. Additionally, each PO is asked (a second-order belief
question) about the amount of bribe he believes the C thinks PO will demand; the choices being
0M (approve the prize), or 200M, or 400M, or 600M. Each subject is incentivized to report her
belief accurately by an additional payment of 25M for each belief-related question, if the belief
matches the actual response of the partner. The rich data on beliefs allow us to identify the
deeper psychological mechanisms at play. Besides, a player’s belief about the matched player’s
decisions may reflect how the former expects a representative individual of the larger society to
act in a situation that potentially involves corruption.
The Control Treatment described above is devoid of any anticorruption mechanism. As such,
the only cost of indulging in corruption is one of intrinsic moral cost. Each audit treatment
incorporates a specific stage where an anticorruption mechanism is implemented.

4.2 Audit Treatments
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Figure 2 depicts the Audit Treatments. The two Audit Treatments are almost similar to each
other, except for a couple of parameters. We proceed by describing a generic Audit Treatment,
followed by a discussion of the parameters that distinguish the treatments.
[Figure 2 here]
Notice that an Audit Treatment is comprised of three stages, where Stages 1 and 2 are
identical to those of the Control Treatment. A new stage (Stage 3) is introduced at the end of
Stage 2. The new stage involves an audit with probability 𝑝 of all successful transactions
(between C and PO) in which PO either approves the prize or demands a bribe which C accepts.
Since no further consequence is needed if an audit finds that PO has approved the prize, for
simplicity, Figure 2 does not depict the situation that there is an audit with probability 𝑝 even
when PO approves the prize. Instead, the figure shows that an audit is conducted with probability
𝑝 for only those transactions in which a bribe is demanded and accepted.13 If the audit finds a
bribe demand, the C gets the bribe amount back and a fine is deducted from the PO’s salary. The
experimental design gives immunity to the C when she accepts a bribe demand, which conforms
with the extant literature on harassment bribe (Basu, 2011; Abbink et al., 2014).14
Our main goal is to study the POs’ decisions under two equivalent audit treatments. The
equivalence originates from the fact that for a representative PO, the expected payoff from an
audit remains unchanged across the two treatments, for each possible bribe demand: in one
treatment the probability of an audit is low and the fine is high, whereas, in the other, the
13

The audit is not directed to those situations where a bribe demand is rejected. In reality, if law-enforcement budget
is limited, it might be difficult for authorities to determine (in an ex-post sense) whether a given potential transaction
failed due to a rejection of bribe demand, or due to incorrectly filed documents that have been returned to the
citizen. As such, we decided to restrict the scope of the audits to successful transactions.
14

The design acknowledges the fact that in numerous instances, a citizen in India is literally forced to pay a
harassment bribe for critical entitled services, when faced with the alternative option of the service not being
provided. As such, for a citizen, acceptance is a strictly dominant strategy over rejection. It will be clear in the next
section that, given our experimental design, a citizen’s expected payoff from acceptance of a bribe demand is more
than the payoff from rejection.
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probability of an audit is high and the fine is low. Using the previous notations, a PO’s expected
payoff from demanding a bribe of 𝑏 is given by
𝐸(𝜋) = 𝑝(1000 − 𝐹(𝑏)) + (1 − 𝑝)(1000 + 𝑏)

(2)

To test Hypothesis 2A, we design two treatments with identical 𝐸(𝜋); one with low 𝑝 and
high 𝐹, and the other with high 𝑝 and low 𝐹. The experimental design is informed by plotting the
iso-expected-payoff curves (IEPC) for each bribe demand. An IEPC is a locus of 𝑝 and 𝐹 such
that 𝐸(𝜋) remains the same along a curve. The slope of an IEPC is obtained by totally
differentiating equation (2), setting 𝑑(𝐸(𝜋)) = 0, and rearranging terms
𝑑𝐹
𝐹+𝑏
|
=−
𝑑𝑝 𝑑(𝐸(𝜋))=0
𝑝

(3)
[Figure 3 here]

Figure 3 plots the IEPCs for three different bribe levels in the 𝑝 − 𝐹 space and it is
characterized by the following features: one, expected payoff from bribe demand is higher than
that from being honest; two, higher the bribe demand, higher is the expected payoff; three, higher
the bribe demand, higher is the imposed fine under an audit. We choose two (𝑝, 𝐹) combinations
for each expected payoff level. Each combination is realistic and has precedence of earlier use in
the literature, in addition to being easy for subjects to make heuristics calculations with. It is
worth noting here that parameterizing probability of detection is tricky. There is no reliable
estimate of what proportion of all corruption is actually audited in reality, given the clandestine
nature of the activity. As a result, we rely on parameters used in past studies as reference points.
For instance, Friesen (2012) employ inspection probabilities of 10%, 20% 30% … 90% but does
not find a differential deterrence effect between inspection probabilities of 10% and 20%. In a
similar fashion, Bruner (2009) employs probability of reward in increments of 10 percentage
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points, from 10% to 100%. India National Crime Records Bureau Report (2010) mentions that
around 40% of officials, who take bribe and are reported against, pay a fine.15 Inspired by this
evidence, Abbink et al. (2014) use 40% as detection probability. With these references in mind,
we assign 40% probability of detection in the high probability with low fine treatment (HP,
henceforth), and 20% probability of detection in the low probability with high fine treatment
(LP, henceforth). Note that when moving from HP to LP, the detection probability is halved.
Correspondingly, the fine is higher (lower) in LP (HP).16
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 describes the fine schedule for each bribe demand and the PO’s expected payoff. As
an illustration, assume that the PO demands a bribe of 400M and the C accepts. Note that if the
PO is caught, the fine is 600M (100M) under LP (HP). As such, under LP, the PO earns (1000M
– 600M) with probability 0.2 and (1000M + 400M) with probability 0.8; the expected payoff
being 1200M. Similarly, under HP, the PO earns (1000M – 100M) with probability 0.4 and
(1000M + 400M) with probability 0.6; the expected payoff being 1200M. Also, note that under
any audit treatment and any bribe demand, the C is better off “accepting” than “rejecting” since
the former may lead to the PO getting caught, in which case C’s entitlement will be returned.17,18
The above features of the experimental design captures the essence of harassment bribe in India.

15

Being official data, this may actually be an overestimation of the actual rate of penalty.
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Table 1 makes it clear that it would have been logistically difficult for us to have designed a treatment with a
detection probability of 10% (i.e., 𝑝 = 0.1) or lower. Note that under 𝑝 = 0.2, the fine for a 600𝑀 bribe demand is
900𝑀. As such, under 𝑝 = 0.1, the fine for a 600𝑀 bribe demand would have exceeded 1000𝑀, thereby raising the
possibility that a PO could end up with a negative payoff at the end of the experiment. Alternatively, it would have
necessitated recalibration of the entire experiment.
17

For instance, if 𝑝 = 0.2, and 𝑏 = 400𝑀 (or, 600𝑀), a C is better off accepting the bribe demand for an expected
payoff of 0.8*[1000M – 400M] + 0.2*1000M = 680M (or, 0.8*[1000M – 600M] + 0.2*1000M = 520M), than
rejecting for a payoff of 400M. Thus, for a C, the strategy of “Accept” dominates “Reject”.
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All treatments (Control, LP, and HP) share a common Nash equilibrium (NE): (Demand 600M, Accept), where
the first (second) strategy in the parenthesis corresponds to the PO (Citizen). In addition, only for Control, (Demand
600M, Reject) is also a NE.
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In our experiment, we do not directly measure risk attitude in an incentivized manner. Such
incentivized risk preference measurement constitutes an experiment in itself and therefore, would
have been logistically difficult to administer, given that our main experiment is quite long and
significantly time consuming. Instead, we adopt a survey based measure of generalized risk from
Dohmen et al. (2011), who experimentally validate the measure with incentivized choice. The
survey question is the following: “How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is
fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please mention a whole
number between 0 and 10, where the number 0 means ‘not at all willing to take risks', and the
number 10 means ‘very willing to take risks'.” While response to this survey measure cannot be
mapped to risk averse, risk neutral, and risk loving categories, a comparison of the underlying
distribution of the survey based risk measure across the treatments can tell us if the observed
treatment effects may be explained by the risk attitude. As an additional robustness check, we
will examine if our results hold after eliminating potential risk loving and risk neutral agents,
defined in terms of certain ranges of the risk attitude distribution, from our sample. More on this
in section 4.4.

4.3 Experimental Procedure
Experiment 1 was conducted with undergraduate students at a large public university in
India. A total of 304 subjects were recruited (38 pairs per treatment). Each subject participated in
only one role of each treatment. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatments and roles. Two
different rooms were used for the roles of the Cs and the POs. Since the students were well
versed in English, the instructions were written (and read out) in English. Many examples,
focused on possible earnings for a C and a PO, were discussed. Each experimental session lasted
for approximately 1.5 hours. The participants’ final earnings were converted from Mohors to
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Indian Rupee, and were paid out in cash. The earnings ranged from Rs. 160 to Rs. 640 with an
average of Rs. 373.07 (21.95 USD in PPP terms).

4.4 Results
[Figure 4]
Figure 4 provides a snapshot of the participants' decisions in Experiment 1. The average
bribe demand is lower in any of the audit treatments, in comparison to Control. Similarly, the
proportion of POs who demand bribe is lower in the audit treatments, in comparison to Control.
For both measures, the difference between Control and LP is statistically significant. The lower
panel of the figure shows that the percentage of the Cs who are willing to accept a bribe demand
is a decreasing function of the amount demanded, irrespective of the treatment. In Control, if a
PO demands 600M in return for approving the prize, the C will end up with the basic payoff of
400M, no matter whether she chooses to accept or reject the demand. To ensure that the PO does
not earn any payoff from such bribe demand, it is likely that significantly more Cs will reject
(than accept) in a tit for tat manner. This explains the rationale for why a very low percentage of
the Cs are willing to accept a 600M bribe demand in Control.
Figure A1 in Appendix 2 depicts the distribution of bribe demand for each treatment. The
distributions for Control and HP appear as closely similar. However, the distribution for LP
seems different from the rest of the two distributions. LP witnesses a significantly higher
percentage of POs approving the prize or demanding a bribe of 200M, in comparison to Control
and HP.
The mean for variables of interest for each treatment and the treatment wise mean differences
are reported in Tables 2A and 2B. Note that the Cs in LP and HP realize that if they accept a
bribe demand, they may earn back their entire prize money because of the possibility of an audit.
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Such strategic considerations are absent in the Control treatment. This explains the difference in
acceptance rates between the Control and the audit treatments, particularly for higher bribe
amounts.
For the POs, the possibilities of an audit with an associated fine are a deterrent to bribe
demand. 15.79% POs choose to approve the prize in Control, as opposed to 42.11% and 23.68%
in LP and HP, respectively. The difference between Control and LP is statistically significant (2
test, p<0.01). On the intensive margin, the average bribe demand including the zeroes is 321M,
152M and 294M for the Control, LP and HP, respectively. The differences are statistically
significant between Control and LP (t-test, p<0.01). Similar results hold if one considers average
bribe demand excluding the zeroes. An interesting picture emerges from these analyzes which
gives our first result.
Result 1A: In comparison to Control, LP has a significant effect on the likelihood of bribe
demand and the amount demanded, however, HP has little and statistically insignificant effect on
both fronts.
Result 1A suggests that Hypothesis 1A is only partly valid, i.e., possibilities of audit and fine
in itself are not a sufficient deterrent, but possibility of audit characterized by high fine is.
The Cs expect a larger likelihood of honesty than is actually the case. However, the
qualitative treatment effects that we observe among the POs are also valid for the Cs. They
expect a higher proportion of the POs to not demand bribe in LP (55.26%) than either in Control
(34.21%), or HP (36.84%). When it comes to bribe amount, once again, the Cs expect a smaller
average bribe demand than is actually the case. However, qualitatively, the treatment effects in
the Cs’ belief are very similar to the treatment effects in actual bribe demand. The expected
average bribe demand is smallest for LP (136M) and its difference from Control and HP are
statistically significant (t-test, p=0.06 and t-test, p=0.03, respectively). The above discussion
suggests that Hypothesis 1B is only partly valid and gives us our next result.
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Result 1B: Possibility of audit and fine by itself is not sufficient to lower beliefs about how
corrupt an environment is, but possibility of audit characterized by high fine is.
Do the POs behave in a manner consistent with the Beckerian framework in LP and HP? The
proportion of the honest POs in LP and HP are 42.11% and 23.68%, respectively. The difference
is statistically significant (2 test, p=0.09). The average bribe demand including the zeroes
(excluding the zeroes) are 152M and 294M (263M and 386M) in LP and HP, respectively; the
difference between the treatments being statistically significant (t-test, p<0.01) in each case. This
gives us one of the main results in this paper.
Result 2A: A comparison of the three different outcomes between LP and HP suggests that
the LP treatment offers a more effective deterrent to corruption than the HP treatment.
Result 2A is consistent with the Beckerian framework, from which Hypothesis 2A is derived.
While our results are consistent with the Beckerian framework, they may also be explained by
alternative behavioral frameworks such as Prospect Theory, according to which individuals
overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities. While our set up cannot rule
out or identify alternative mechanisms at play, this is a promising line of future work.19
Our data further suggests that the Cs’ belief about the proportion of honest POs in LP
(55.26%) is greater than the same in HP (36.84%) (2 test, p=0.11). Correspondingly, the Cs’
believe that average bribe demand including the zeroes (excluding the zeroes) are 136M and
242M (305M and 383M) in LP and HP, respectively; the difference between the treatments is
statistically significant when we include the zeroes (t-test, p=0.03), but not when we exclude the
zeroes (t-test, p=0.13). This gives us our next result and it is consistent with Hypothesis 2B.
Result 2B: Citizens believe that POs are more likely to be honest in the LP treatment than in
the HP treatment.

19

We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention.
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Our core results go through after controlling for demographic and other variables in a
regression framework. Table A1 in Appendix 2 which reports the summary statistics of the
explanatory variables also presents the definitions of these variables. We use these variables in
the regression models presented in Table A2 in Appendix 2. The table presents marginal effects
under multiple model specifications. An approval of the prize is treated as zero demand for bribe
for each model. The OLS model (negative binomial model) treats bribe demand as a continuous
variable (count variable: 0, 1, 2, 3). The logit model treats bribe demand as a binary variable (1,
if demand > 0), and thereby focuses on the extensive margin. Across the model specifications,
LP has a statistically significant deterrent effect on bribe demand, when compared to Control. At
the intensive margin (OLS) [extensive margin (logit)], LP lowers bribe demand [probability of
bribe demand] by approximately 168M [28% to 33%], in comparison to Control.
Among the other covariates, the variable “Risk” has a statistically significant positive impact
on bribe demand. At the intensive (extensive) margin, a one-point increase in Risk leads to a
14.38M (3%) increase in bribe demand (probability of bribe demand). As pointed out earlier,
Becker’s theory predicts that low probability of detection with high fine is a greater deterrent
than high probability with low fine when agents are risk averse. Given that our measure of Risk
cannot identify a risk lover, risk neutral or risk averse agent, how do we know that our results are
consistent with the prediction of Becker? To ensure that the results are consistent, we need to
show, beyond any reasonable doubt, that: (a) our result is not driven by risk neutral or risk loving
agents i.e. our result holds even if we exclude from the overall subject pool the potential risk
loving and risk neutral POs, (b) the observed effect of LP on curbing bribe demand is not borne
by a significant difference in the distribution of Risk across the treatments, and (c) overall, the
regression models presented in Table A2 in Appendix 2 do not drastically change if we
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categorize Risk into fewer groups, instead of letting it enter the models on a (linear) 0 to 10
scale.20 The next three paragraphs briefly address the above issues in the same order.
An emerging literature maps risk aversion in population in certain countries through
representative samples. For instance, Dohmen et al. (2011) report that 9% of the Germans are
risk loving. Harrison et al. (2007) note that “very few subjects are risk loving or risk neutral” and
that “risk aversion is by far a better characterization of the risk preference of an average Dane.”
This is also consistent with Holt and Laury (2002, 2005). In the absence of a similar study in
India, we do not have a strong prior on what proportion of our sample is risk averse. Instead, we
conduct a set of robustness checks by restricting our sample to bottom 90, 80, 70, 60 and 50th
percentiles of the Risk distribution, to make sure our results are not driven by risk loving or risk
neutral agents. Table A3 in Appendix 2 presents the marginal effects from OLS regression
results. Column (1) makes use of the full sample while subsequent columns use the restricted
sample. Two main results emerge: First, the treatment effect of LP on bribe demand persists even
as we restrict the sample. Second, as we exclude the top 20 percentile (column 4) and thereby
potentially exclude the POs with risk neutral and risk loving preferences, the coefficient of Risk
no longer turns out as statistically significant. Stated differently, this result is in accord with the
extant literature discussed above: once we focus only on the risk averse POs, Risk does not
influence bribe demand any longer, however, the treatment effect of LP remains significant.
Figure A2 in Appendix 2 presents a histogram of the POs' Risk distribution for each
treatment. The mean of Risk considering all POs in all treatments in Experiment 1 is 5.96. Each
histogram plots the relative frequency for four different ranges: 0–3 (low category), 4–6 (mild
category), 7–8 (moderately high category), and 9–10 (high category). We also performed a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of the Risk distribution between pairs of treatments. The
20

We thank an anonymous referee for bringing our attention to (b) and (c) above.
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results are reported underneath the figure. We did not find any statistically significant difference
between any two treatments.
Table A4 in Appendix 2 presents additional regression models in which Risk is categorized
into fewer groups. Categorized Risk is defined as 1, 2, 3 and 4 for Risk range 0-3, 4-6, 7-8, and
9-10, respectively. Per expectation, for all models, the marginal effect of Categorized Risk
emerges as statistically significant and positive. For instance, for the OLS model, a one unit
upward movement in Categorized Risk induces a PO to increase bribe demand by 34.06M units.
In addition, the coefficient of LP dummy continues to remain negative and statistically
significant across all the models.
Finally, Table A5 in Appendix 2 presents regression models on the Cs' acceptance decision.
The treatment features made it possible for us to make only one inference about a representative
Cs' decision. Note that in the audit treatments, "Accept" is a strictly dominant strategy for any C
over "Reject"; whereas in Control, "Accept" is a weakly dominant strategy over "Reject". As
such, it is likely that the maximum bribe acceptable to the Citizens (MBAC, henceforth) will be
higher on an average in the audit treatments than in Control. Indeed, this subtle difference
between the treatments may serve as an explanation for the observed statistically significant and
positive marginal effect for the audit treatment dummies, under the OLS and negative binomial
models with full specifications. When we define the acceptance decision as a binary variable
(which takes a value 0 if the citizen is unwilling to accept any bribe demand or 1 otherwise), we
do not find a statistically significant treatment effect for any treatment. This gives us our next
result.
Result 2C: The maximum bribe acceptable to the Citizens is higher in the audit treatments than
that in the control treatment.
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It is worthwhile to note here that the final objective of any policy is to reduce successful
bribery. Now that may be achieved by lowering either bribe demand or bribe acceptance or both.
So how do our treatments perform so far as this objective is concerned? Table 2A reports that the
percentage of successful bribery decreased from 57.89% in Control to 44.74% in T1, which then
increased to 52.63% in T2. However, none of the differences are statistically significant as per
the chi-square tests.

5.1 Experiment 2: Experimental Design and Procedure
The aim of Experiment 2 was to examine if ethics education had an effect on unethical
conduct, as measured by the control treatment of Experiment 1. In terms of equation (1), we
expected to raise the intrinsic moral cost of demanding bribe (𝑚(𝑏)) through ethics education
and thereby reduce the expected utility from demanding bribe. We conducted Experiment 2 with
student subjects at a business school in India. Most MBA programs in India have a compulsory
ethics course embedded in it. The aim of the course is to reinforce principled ethical conduct
among future business professionals. Our experiment employed a between subject design and
involved first year MBA students. Our choice of first year MBA students was based on two
factors: first, they were a month into the program and having come from varied backgrounds,
they had not yet imbibed the norms of the environment; and second, they had not yet been
introduced to the compulsory course on ethics, which made treatment comparisons possible.
The ethics module was adapted from the regular Ethics course due to be taught later in the
year. The module consisted of four lectures of two hours each, scheduled to be taught once each
successive week. The topics of the four lectures were: Ethics, Morals and Values – An Overview
(Lecture 1), Ethics and Business (Lecture 2), Ethical Conduct in Politics and Public Life (Lecture
3), and Ethics and Society (Lecture 4). The content was primarily drawn from the compulsory
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ethics course; the pedagogical details were decided by two regular instructors responsible for
teaching ethics. Lectures 1 and 2 were delivered by one instructor and Lectures 3 and 4 were
delivered by the other instructor across both the treatments. This approach ensured that there was
no difference in the delivery of the material across treatments. Thus, the module was
administered just as the regular course on ethics would be conducted. The lectures included a
significant amount of discussion on corruption and its ills on developing countries like India.
Students did not receive credit for attending the module, but were actively encouraged to do
so by the program administration. To minimize attrition and maximize participation, students
were informed that they could participate in an event and earn prize money after the completion
of the ethics module, but only if they had attended all the four lectures. We took special care to
minimize experimenter demand effect – one, we did not tell the students upfront that the “event”
was an experiment; two, experimenter was nowhere seen as the one either conducting or
organizing the sessions on ethics module.
Per the admission policies of the university, students were admitted sequentially as per the
merit list, however, the process of their assignment to any one of the sections is completely
random. In fact, the administration takes special care in ensuring that students are randomized
into sections, in order to avoid possibilities that one section goes academically ahead and another
falls behind. Given that the students were randomized into sections only a month back and they
were only a month into the program, we decided to randomize sections into treatments. This
effectively meant that students were randomized into treatments and finally, we had three
sections randomized into the three treatments. This was also logistically much more convenient
for us to schedule the lectures and conduct the experimental sessions.
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The baseline bribery game without the bells and whistles of probability of audit and fine was
the ideal instrument through which we could measure the pure effect of ethics education. In
Treatment 1 (T1, henceforth), students were introduced to the ethics module over four weeks. In
the fifth week, they were invited to participate in the bribery game. In Treatment 2 (T2,
henceforth) too, students were introduced to the ethics module over four weeks. However, they
were invited to participate in the bribery game only in the eighth week, i.e., good four weeks
after the module was completed. Thus, while T1 gave us an immediate measure, T2 gave us a
delayed measure of ethics module on ethical conduct. In the control treatment (T0 henceforth),
we did not introduce the ethics module to the subjects, but simply recorded their responses in the
experimental game in the very first week in order to avoid possible contamination from T1 and
T2. Spill over about the nature of the corruption game from T1 to T2 after the fifth week cannot
entirely be ruled out, but it is not clear how that information may have affected behavior in T2.
Anecdotally, subjects in a treatment were not aware that another group of students were
participating in another treatment. Figure 5 provides an overview of the timeline for the
treatments.
[Figure 5 here]
A total of 190 students from the MBA program participated in the three treatments of
Experiment 2, with 30 pairs in T0, 33 in T1, and 32 in T2. The minimum and maximum amount
paid were Rs. 160 and Rs. 640, with an average payoff of Rs. 295 (~ 17.35 USD in PPP terms).

5.2 Results
[Figure 6 here]
Figure 6 illustrates the main results and Tables 3A and 3B report the statistical tests on the
amount of bribe demanded, acceptance rates and the beliefs. The average bribe demanded
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including the zeroes in T0, T1, and T2 are 233.33M, 200M, and 250M, respectively. The
distributions of the bribe demand in each treatment are plotted in Figure A3 in Appendix 2.
Though it appears that the average bribe in T1 is less than that in T0 and T2, neither of the
differences are statistically significant. Similar results emerge when we exclude the zeroes from
consideration. However, the percentage of honest POs increases from 20% in T0 to 39.4% in T1,
the difference being statistically significant (χ2 test, p=0.09). In T2, the honesty percentage
decreases again to 18.8%, making the difference between T2 and T1 statistically significant (χ2
test, p=0.07) again. Further, Table 3A reports that the percentage of successful bribery decreased
from 60% in T0 to 36.36% in T1, which subsequently increased to 68.75%. The difference
between T1 and T0 and that between T1 and T2 are statistically significant (χ2 tests, p=0.06 and
0.01, respectively).
[Table 3A and 3B here]
Thus, the pattern indicates that there had been no change in the bribe amount across
treatments – those who chose to be corrupt in T1 and T2 were just as corrupt as in T0. However,
on the extensive margin, ethics module did have an impact on both likelihood of bribe demand
and successful bribery; albeit for a short while. Thus, our next set of results are consistent with
Hypothesis 3A and 3B from Section 2.
Result 3A: The proportion of POs who demand bribe are lower in T1 than in T0.
Result 3B: The proportion of POs who demand bribe are higher in T2 than in T1, indicating
that the immediate effect of ethics education is greater than that in the longer run.
The actual acceptance rates of Cs decrease from T0 to T1, though the difference is not
statistically significant. It increases from T1 to T2 and the differences both at bribe 200M and
400M are statistically significant (χ2 test, p=0.08 and p=0.01, respectively). These results suggest
that ethics education may have had some initial effect on the Cs’ acceptance behavior, but once

30

again the effects are short lived. One other way of seeing the Citizens’ acceptance behavior is by
comparing the average minimum bribe acceptable to the Citizens (MBAC) across the treatments.
Table A7 reports the regression results – once again we see that MBAC is lower on an average in
T1 than in T0, however, the differences are not statistically significant. This gives us our next
result, which only partly corroborates Hypothesis 3C.
Result 3C: The actual acceptance rate of Citizens is statistically higher in T1 than in T2.
A further consequence of these outcomes may be seen in the proportion of successful bribery
across the treatments. Table 3A shows that successful bribery in T1 is 23.64 percentage points
lower than in T0 (χ2 test, p-value=0.06), and 32.39 percentage points lower than in T2 (χ2 test, pvalue=0.01).
Our experiment is not equipped to tell us why time has a mitigating effect, if not an annulling
one, on the effect of ethics education. Business students are extensively trained in Economics,
Game Theory and other aspects of business studies, which may make them more self-regarding
and hence, more corrupt (Frank and Schulze, 2000; Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993). They may
have been through other life experiences which may have exposed them to bribery or introduced
them to people outside their academic environment, where the ethical norm is likely to be
different. All of the mechanisms above can potentially lead to a mitigating effect over time.
Interestingly, as Table 3B indicates, the POs also expect a smaller proportion of the Cs to
accept bribe demand of 200M and 400M. While the difference between expected acceptance rate
in T0 and T1 is not significantly different for bribe demand 200M, the difference is significantly
different for bribe demand 400M (χ2 test, p=0.03). The expected acceptance rates increase in T2
again for both bribe amount 200M and 400M, but the numbers are not statistically different from
T1.
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The pattern is similar when it comes to the Cs’ belief about how corrupt the POs are. The Cs
expect the POs to extract an average bribe of 293.3M, 242M and 318M in T0, T1 and T2,
respectively. The difference between T1 and T2 is statistically significant (t-test, p=0.07). The Cs
also expect more honest POs in T1 than in T0 and T2. The pattern in the Cs’ data is similar to
what we observed among the POs. The ethics module does have an effect, both in terms of how
acceptable paying bribe is for the Cs and their expectations about how corrupt the POs are.
However, the impact is again short lived. When measured after four weeks in T2, the effect
vanishes. Further, the Cs do not believe that the POs will choose to be any less corrupt in terms
of the bribe amount. They only expect a smaller proportion of the POs to demand bribe in T1,
compared to T0. This impact too vanishes in T2, when measured four weeks after the
intervention. These results are reinforced in the regression results reported in Table A6 in
Appendix 2.
6. Comparison of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
A comparison of results from Experiments 1 and 2 is tricky, as discussed earlier. The two
experiments were conducted with two different subject pools, and therefore, the treatment means
may not be readily comparable. In fact, the subject pool effects are readily observable with the
average bribe demand including the zeroes being 321M and 233M in the baseline treatment of
Experiment 1 and 2, respectively. As a result, if we are looking to compare the results of the two
experiments, we may compare the normalized treatment effects by computing the percentage
changes relative to the baseline treatment in each experiment. In Experiment 2, the likelihood of
honest POs increased from T0 to T1 by 19.4 percentage points (χ2 test, p=0.09), which is 97% of
the number of honest POs in T0. The treatment difference between T2 and T0 is more modest
and is statistically insignificant. In Experiment 1, the likelihood of honest POs in LP and HP is
more than that in the baseline by 26.32 and 7.89 percentage points, respectively. These numbers

32

translate to increases in 166.69% and 49.97% of the baseline number of honest POs in the
Control treatment, for LP and HP, respectively. Only the difference between LP and Control is
statistically significant.
For average bribe, we normalize the treatment effects by reporting the effects in terms of
standard deviation changes from the baseline treatments. In Experiment 1, the average bribe
demand excluding the zeroes (including the zeroes) in LP is 0.87 (0.95) standard deviation lesser
than in Control, both the difference being statistically significant at 1% level. However, the
corresponding differences in Experiment 2 are quantitatively smaller and statistically
insignificant. This gives us our final result corresponding to Hypothesis 3D.
Result 3D: The effect of probability of detection and fine on PO’s bribe demand behavior is
greater than that of ethics module. Thus, monetary interventions have a far greater deterrence
effect on bribe demand behavior than non-monetary interventions.
Further, norm changing interventions such as ethics education has little effect on the amount
of bribe demanded, but they operate primarily through changing the likelihood of engaging in
unethical act. Herberich, List and Price (2011) is the only study we know of that arrives at a
similar conclusion – they find that normative appeals affect the extensive margin and price
incentive based interventions work on both the intensive and extensive margins for green
technology adoption. Future studies in this area can potentially uncover the underlying channels
for why that is the case.
An important issue which is unraveled in course of the comparison between Experiment 1
and Experiment 2 relates to rate of successful bribery. In Experiment 1 we do not see a
significant decrease in successful bribery in either LP or HP, primarily because monetary
interventions induce citizens to accept bribes more often. However, in Experiment 2 we do find a
significant decrease in successful bribery in the short run, primarily driven by Citizens’ lower
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acceptance rate in T1. In quantitative terms, the reduction in successful bribery in LP is 22.72%
of the successful bribery level in the Control treatment of Experiment 1. But the reduction in
successful bribery in T1 is 39.4% of the successful bribery level in T0 of Experiment 2. Clearly,
the ethics module has been more effective than monetary interventions so far as reducing overall
bribery is concerned, though the effect disappears in the longer run. Once again it is evident that
the intrinsic and extrinsic effects operate through different mechanisms – the latter can create
perverse incentives, which can end up hurting the ultimate objective of the policy intervention21.

7. Summary and Conclusion
In developing countries such as India, corruption is a significant impediment to development.
Our paper uses experimental data to investigate alternative strategies to combat a class of
corruption widely prevalent in many developing countries, namely, harassment bribery. Given
that it is difficult to test some of the predictions of economic theory in the context of corruption
due to the clandestine nature of the activity, laboratory based experimental games provide us
with a useful tool to observe bribery behavior. In two experiments, we study the disincentive
effects of raising extrinsic and intrinsic costs of indulging in corruption. In Experiment 1 we
compare the two principle levers of anti-corruption interventions, namely probability of audit
and amount of fine. In particular, we test the Beckerian prediction, which follows from expected
utility framework, that low probability of detection and high fine is a greater deterrent than high
probability of audit and low fine for the same level of expected payoff. Indeed, it is the low
probability of detection and high fine that serves as a more effective deterrent both in terms of
likelihood of bribe demand and bribe amount. In fact, in our experiment, high probability and
low fine has no effect, whatsoever, on bribery behavior.
21

We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this important issue to our attention.
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Our results also throw light on a long standing paradoxical result in the literature. The fact
that Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) find introducing fine has an effect but Schulze and
Frank (2003) do not, may now be explained by the following feature of their respective
experimental design — fine was higher in the former while probability of audit was higher in the
latter. Our result that fine has a greater deterrence than probability of audit can help explain why
the results were contradictory in the first place.
Do our conclusions extend to other parameter combinations as well? We believe they do. It is
possible that quantitatively the results may vary but qualitatively, a smaller probability of
detection with higher fine will be a greater deterrent to corruption than higher probability of
detection and smaller fine, ceteris paribus. Notice, this conclusion holds only for risk averse
people and we believe that the perpetrators of the class of harassment bribery we studied are
indeed characterized by risk aversion. However, our conclusions may not hold for big ticket
corruptions and certainly will not hold for organized crime, where the perpetrators may have an
entirely different risk profile. In fact, Becker’s theory contends that risk lovers, will be deterred
more by a higher probability of detection with lower fine. Our paper of course is not equipped to
test that hypothesis.
Our second experiment aimed to raise the moral cost of indulging in corruption by subjecting
participants to normative appeals through an ethics educational module. We find that ethics
education has a small and significant effect in the likelihood of bribe demand but no effect on the
bribe amount. Further, the effect is short lived and disappears in four weeks. A guarded
comparative analysis of the extrinsic and intrinsic approaches to deter corruption suggests that
the former is more effective in deterring bribe demand than the latter. A caveat in this regard:
like in any other module driven descriptive intervention, it is hard to say what would have
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happened if, for the same time span, the treatment intensity of ethics module was increased. Our
results indicate a direction and scope for a rich set of future studies in this context.
It is important to note that the two approaches operate through different underlying
mechanisms. In general, the extrinsic disincentive based interventions may create perverse
effects, which may act against the final objective of the intervention itself. In our experiment, it
was rational on the part of the Citizens from a purely strategic sense to accept bribe demand
more often in the audit treatments. This rendered the intervention ineffective from the standpoint
of overall bribery. From this perspective, absence of such narrow strategic considerations may
make normative appeals through ethics campaign relatively more effective. Thus overall,
depending on the outcome one is interested in, the great emperor Ashoka may be thought of as
both right and wrong.
Our results do not however imply that collective societal approaches aimed at raising
intrinsic moral cost and thereby, changing the social norm governing corruption, is not useful.
Our preferred interpretation of the result is that in order to make a lasting dent on corruption,
ethics education should be administered at regular intervals. Of course, our experiment does not
have the means to test such long term effects, which will remain as an important area for future
work. Further, the intervention was aimed at people with an average age of 22.5 – an age where
the moral compass of an individual has already been formed. Future research may identify the
differential effects of normative appeals among children and young adults.
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Figure 1: Control Treatment
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Figure 2: Audit Treatments

Figure 3: IEPC, Possible Bribe Demands, and Chosen Parameter Values
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Figure 4: Average Bribe Demand, Proportion of Corrupt POs and Average Acceptance Rate in
Experiment 1

Figure 5: Timeline of Experiment 2
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Figure 6: Average Bribe Demand, Proportion of Corrupt POs and Average Acceptance Rate in
Experiment 2
Table 1: Fine Schedule and Expected Payoff for Public Official under Audit Treatments
Low Probability
= 0.2

High Probability
= 0.4

PO’s Expected
Payoff

Demand 200M

300M

50M

1100M

Demand 400M

600M

100M

1200M

Demand 600M

900M

150M

1300M

Treatment
Bribe Amount
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Table 2A: Mean Differences in Decisions across Treatments in Experiment 1
Control
(CTR)

Low Prob
(LP)

High Prob
(HP)

Difference
LP – CTR

Difference
HP – CTR

Difference
LP – HP

–2.64
(0.69)
5.27
(0.60)
28.94***
(0.00)

7.49*
(0.08)
18.42**
(0.04)
42.10***
(0.00)

–10.53**
(0.04)
–13.15
(0.13)
–13.16
(0.25)

–26.31
(0.57)
4.96
(0.89)
7.89
(0.39)

–142.11***
(0.00)
–122.57***
(0.00)
18.43*
(0.09)

Citizens’ Acceptance Rates
Acceptance Rate for Bribe = 200M (%)

92.11%

89.47%

100.00%

Acceptance Rate for Bribe = 400M (%)

71.05%

76.32%

89.47%

Acceptance Rate for Bribe = 600M (%)

10.53%

39.47%

52.63%

Public Officials’ Actual Bribe Demand
Average Bribe Demand

321.05

152.63

294.74

Average Bribe Demand > 0

381.25

263.64

386.21

Actual Bribe Demand = 0 (%)

15.79%

42.11%

23.68%

–168.42***
(0.00)
–117.61***
(0.00)
26.32***
(0.01)

Percentage of Successful Match Between Bribee (PO) and Briber (C)
–13.15
–5.26
–7.89
(0.25)
(0.65)
(0.49)
Note: (Average Bribe Demand) [Average Bribe Demand > 0] indicates the average bribe demand (including the zeroes)
[excluding the zeroes]. Actual Bribe Demand = 0 (%) indicates the percentage of POs with zero actual demand. For
(Control) [Audit] treatment, “Successful Bribery” indicates those transactions in which PO demanded a positive amount
of bribe that C agreed to pay, and (therefore the transactions ended successfully) [the transactions were not chosen for
audit, which resulted in the transactions ending successfully]. When (averages) [proportions] are compared, bracketed
numbers represent p-values from (t-tests) [chi-square tests].
Percentage of Successful Bribery

57.89%

44.74%

52.63%

Table 2B: Mean Differences in Beliefs across Treatments in Experiment 1
Control
(CTR)

Low Prob
(LP)

High Prob
(HP)

Difference
LP – CTR

Difference
HP – CTR

Difference
LP – HP

21.05
(0.68)
47.33
(0.32)
2.63
(0.81)

–105.26**
(0.03)
–77.45
(0.13)
18.42
(0.11)

0.00
(1.00)
15.79*
(0.06)
36.85***
(0.00)

–2.63
(0.56)
–13.16*
(0.10)
–2.64
(0.82)

Citizens’ Belief about Public Officials’ Bribe Demand
Expected Bribe Demand

221.05

136.84

242.11

Expected Bribe Demand > 0

336.00

305.88

383.33

Expected Bribe Demand = 0 (%)

34.21%

55.26%

36.84%

–84.21*
(0.06)
–30.12
(0.52)
21.05*
(0.07)

Public Officials’ Belief about Citizens’ Acceptance Rate
Acceptance Rate for Bribe = 200M (%)

97.37%

94.74%

97.37%

Acceptance Rate for Bribe = 400M (%)

76.32%

78.95%

92.11%

Acceptance Rate for Bribe = 600M (%)

5.26%

39.47%

42.11%

–2.63
(0.56)
2.63
(0.78)
34.21***
(0.00)

Second Order Belief: Public Officials’ Belief about Citizens’ Belief about PO’s Bribe Demand
Average of PO’s Belief about Citizens’
–84.21**
21.05
–105.26***
305.26
221.05
326.32
Expectation about PO’s Demand
(0.04)
(0.64)
(0.01)
Note: (Expected Bribe Demand) [Expected Bribe Demand > 0] indicates the average expected bribe demand (including
the zeroes) [excluding the zeros]. Expected Bribe Demand = 0 (%) indicates the percentage of POs with expectation of
zero bribe demand. When (averages) [proportions] are compared, bracketed numbers represent p-values from (t-tests)
[chi-square tests].
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Table 3A: Mean Differences in Decisions across Treatments in Experiment 2
T0

T1

T2

Difference
T1–T0

Difference
T2–T0

Difference
T2–T1

–7.78
(0.41)
–12.12
(0.33)
2.73
(0.61)

7.08
(0.35)
17.71
(0.11)
3.02
(0.59)

14.86*
(0.08)
29.83**
(0.01)
0.19
(0.98)

–33.33
(0.46)
38.33
(0.32)
19.4*
(0.09)

16.67
(0.68)
16.03
(0.63)
1.2
(0.90)

50
(0.28)
22.31
(0.59)
20.6*
(0.07)

Citizens Acceptance Rates (%)
Acceptance Rate for bribe = 200M

86.67

78.89

93.75

Acceptance Rate for bribe = 400M

66.67

54.55

84.38

Acceptance Rate for bribe = 600M

3.33

6.06

6.25

Public Officials’ Actual Bribe Demand
Average Bribe Demand

233.33

200

250

Average Bribe Demand > 0

291.67

330

307

20%

39.4%

18.8%

Actual Bribe Demand = 0 (%)

Percentage of Successful Match Between Bribee (PO) and Briber (C)
–23.64*
8.75
32.39**
(0.06)
(0.47)
(0.01)
Note: (Average Bribe Demand) [Average Bribe Demand > 0] indicates the average bribe demand (including the
zeroes) [excluding the zeroes]. Actual Bribe Demand = 0 (%) indicates the percentage of POs with zero actual
demand. When (averages) [proportions] are compared, bracketed numbers represent p-values from (t-tests) [chi-square
tests]. We acknowledge that the number of POs for whom Actual Bribe Demand > 0 is small (i.e., 24, 20 and 26 for
T0, T1 and T2, respectively) which can potentially invalidate some of the assumptions for a t-test. However, a nonparametric test of difference yields similar conclusions. (MW Ranksum Test, p-values of the differences are 0.48, 0.79
and 0.66, in the same order as presented in the table).
Percentage of Successful Bribery

60%

36.36%

68.75%

Table 3B: Mean Differences in Beliefs across Treatments in Experiment 2
T0

T1

T2

Difference
T1–T0

Difference
T2–T0

Difference
T2–T1

25.42
(0.53)
–1.5
(0.96)
–7.1
(0.88)

76.3*
(0.07)
20
(0.59)
17.9**
(0.04)

–2.92
(0.59)
–11.25
(0.31)
9.38*
(0.09)

8.90
(0.25)
14.20
(0.24)
3.32
(0.62)

Citizens’ Belief about Public Officials’ Bribe Demand
Expected Bribe Demand

293.3

242.4

318

Expected Bribe Demand > 0

338.5

320

340

Expected bribe Demand = 0

13.3%

24.2%

6.3%

–50.9
(0.25)
–18.5
(0.62)
10.9
(0.27)

Public Officials’ Belief about Citizens’ Acceptance Rate
Acceptance Rate for bribe = 200M

96.67

84.85

93.75

Acceptance Rate for bribe = 400M

80

54.55

68.75

Acceptance Rate for bribe = 600M

0

6.06

9.38

11.82
(0.11)
–25.45**
(0.03)
6.06
(0.17)

Second Order Belief: Public Officials’ Belief about Citizens’ Belief about PO’s Bribe Demand
–21.93
14.82
36.74
(0.52)
(0.64)
(0.30)
Note: (Expected Bribe Demand) [Expected Bribe Demand > 0] indicates the average expected bribe demand
(including the zeroes) [excluding the zeros]. Expected Bribe Demand = 0 (%) indicates the percentage of POs with
expectation of zero bribe demand. When (averages) [proportions] are compared, bracketed numbers represent p-values
from (t-tests) [chi-square tests].
Expectation of Citizens’ Expectation

325.9

304
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340.7

Appendix 1
Here is a theoretical framework that is based on expected utility, along the lines of Becker.
Suppose a PO is deliberating on how much bribe to demand. Consider an initial situation where
the probability of audit and the fine are given by 𝑝 and 𝐹, respectively. The expected payoff is
given by
𝐸(𝜋) = 𝑝(𝑤 − 𝐹) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑤 + 𝑏) = −𝑝𝐹 + 𝑤 + 𝑏 − 𝑝𝑏 … … … … … … (1)
In terms of our audit treatments, now assume that we move from HP to LP by virtue of an
increase in 𝐹 and a decrease in 𝑝, such that the PO stays on the same iso-expected-payoff curve
as in equation (1). Totally differentiating equation (1), we obtain
𝑑(𝐸(𝜋)) = 0 ⟹ −𝑝𝑑𝐹 − 𝐹𝑑𝑝 − 𝑏𝑑𝑝 = 0 ⟹ −(𝐹 + 𝑏)𝑑𝑝 = 𝑝𝑑𝐹
⟹

𝑑𝑝
𝑝
=−
… … … … … … (2)
𝑑𝐹
(𝐹 + 𝑏)

The PO’s expected utility is given by
𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑝𝑈(𝑤 − 𝐹) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑈(𝑤 + 𝑏) … … … … … … (3)
To analyze the impact of an increase in 𝐹 (and a corresponding decrease in 𝑝 so that 𝐸(𝜋) stays
constant) on 𝐸(𝑈), we differentiate both sides of equation (3) with respect to 𝐹 to obtain
𝑑𝐸(𝑈)
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑝
= 𝑈(𝑤 − 𝐹)
+ 𝑝𝑈 ′ (𝑤 − 𝐹)(−1) + 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝑏) (− )
𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝐹
𝑑𝐹
Using equation (2) in the above equation we obtain
𝑑𝐸(𝑈)
𝑝
𝑝
=−
𝑈(𝑤 − 𝐹) − 𝑝𝑈 ′ (𝑤 − 𝐹) +
𝑈(𝑤 + 𝑏)
𝑑𝐹
(𝐹 + 𝑏)
(𝐹 + 𝑏)
⟹

𝑑𝐸(𝑈)
𝑈(𝑤 + 𝑏) − 𝑈(𝑤 − 𝐹)
= −𝑝 [𝑈
}] … … … … … … (4)
⏟′ (𝑤 − 𝐹) − {
𝑑𝐹
⏟ (𝑤 + 𝑏) − (𝑤 − 𝐹)
𝑀
𝐴

If the utility function is concave, the marginal rate of change in utility (given by ‘𝑀’ in equation
(4)) is greater than the average rate of change (given by ‘𝐴’). Stated differently, the condition
𝑀 > 𝐴 holds only when tangents to a curve lie above the curve, implying 𝑈 ′′ < 0, i.e., the PO is
risk averse. As such, equation (4) indicates that 𝑈 ′′ < 0 ⟺

𝑑𝐸(𝑈)
𝑑𝐹

< 0. For a risk averse PO, an

increase in fine decreases his expected utility more than an increase in probability of audit, given
that the expected payoff under the two situations remains unchanged. This is shown in the figure
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below: the same expected payoff leads to a higher expected utility under a situation of high
probability and low fine than the alternative of low probability and high fine.
Finally, as discussed before, the above model does not shed any light on how the PO’s expected
utility maximizing bribe demand (b*) will vary across the two policies (LP and HP). An answer
to this question will require a more complicated model. However, a similar result (that shows
that in comparison to HP, LP is more effective in reducing b*) will emerge, even in the context of
the more complicated model (under reasonable conditions).

Figure A1.1: Expected Utility, Risk Aversion and the Audit Treatments

Appendix 2
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Figure A1: Empirical Distribution of Bribe Demand across Treatments in Experiment 1
Note: We reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of bribe demand between Control and LP are equal
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, p-value=0.00) and that between LP and HP are equal (KS test, p-value=0.01).
However, we fail to reject the null that the distribution of bribe demand between Control and HP are equal (KS test,
p-value=1.00)

Figure A2: Empirical Distribution of Risk across Treatments in Experiment 1
Note: The figure corresponds to the POs, and not the Cs. For any given pair of treatments, we fail to reject the null
hypothesis that the distribution of Risk between the treatments is equal. A KS test between the distributions for
(Control and LP) {Control and HP} [LP and HP] yields a p-value of (0.79) {0.21} [0.79].
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Figure A3: Empirical Distribution of Bribe Demand across Treatments in Experiment 2
Note: We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of bribe demand between (T1 and T0) {T2 and T0}
[T1 and T2] are equal (KS test, p-value=0.60) {KS test, p-value=0.99} [KS test, p-value=0.49].

Table A1: Treatment-wise Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables in Experiments 1 & 2
Experiment 1
Variables
Female
Age
LnIncome
Score
Risk

Definition
Binary, 1 if female
Age, in years
Natural log of annual income (in INR)
Average of scores in Class X and XII (in %)
Response to the question on risk (0 to 10)
Number of observations

Variables
Female
Age
LnIncome
Score
Risk

Definition (same as above)

Control
0.34
22.32
10.67
81.36
6.66
38
T0
0.46
22.25
11.58
80.07
6.66
30

Number of observations

LP
0.37
21.47
10.54
82.36
5.68
38
Experiment 2
T1
0.44
22.48
11.78
86.99
5.91
33

Note: The above table corresponds to data from public officials only.

Table A2: Regression Results for Treatment Marginal Effects in Experiment 1
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HP
0.55
21.16
10.43
84.34
5.53
38
T2
0.44
22.61
11.77
82.39
6.39
32

Dependent
variable: Bribe
demand

OLS
(Continuous)

LP Dummy

–168.42***
(40.60)

Negative
Binomial
(Count)
–0.82***
(0.18)

–167.69***
(41.48)

Negative
Binomial
(Count)
–0.77***
(0.17)

–0.33***
(0.01)

HP Dummy

–26.32
(45.05)

–0.10
(0.18)

–29.59
(46.24)

–0.09
(0.17)

–0.18
(0.14)

14.38***
(5.49)

0.08***
(0.03)

0.03**
(0.01)

19.12
(35.43)

0.09
(0.16)

0.08
(0.09)

–17.09***
(5.45)

–0.09***
(0.03)

–0.03**
(0.01)

LnIncome

3.76
(17.29)

0.004
(0.08)

–0.02
(0.05)

Score

–1.14
(3.07)

–0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

χ2 = 32.08

χ2 = 16.82

Logit
(Binary)

OLS
(Continuous)

–0.28**
(0.12)
–0.10
(0.12)

Risk
Female
Age

Intercept

321.05***
(30.68)
R2 = 0.14

Logit
(Binary)

652.31**
(330.62)
χ2 = 14.62

χ2 = 6.60

R2 = 0.23

Note: Control treatment is used as the base treatment. For each model, N = 114. Standard errors are in the parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A3: Marginal Effects from OLS Regression for Varying Risk Values in Experiment 1
≤ 90th
≤ 80th
≤ 70th
≤ 60th
≤ 50th
Percentile
Percentile
Percentile
Percentile
Percentile
Dependent variable:
Column
Column
Column
Column
Column
Column
Bribe demand
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
–167.69*** –142.46*** –129.94*** –140.76*** –156.70***
–156.46**
LP Dummy
(41.48)
(44.35)
(45.46)
(52.12)
(51.57)
(62.21)
–29.59
–26.22
–23.82
–20.92
27.09
33.55
HP Dummy
(46.24)
(49.98)
(53.09)
(54.85)
(59.33)
(75.51)
14.38***
19.22***
20.42***
14.61
10.50
–0.91
Risk
(5.49)
(6.96)
(7.78)
(10.65)
(10.64)
(13.48)
19.12
46.18
53.22
55.88
28.41
36.93
Female
(35.43)
(39.31)
(40.74)
(43.56)
(45.37)
(54.81)
–17.09***
–19.78***
–20.19***
–22.40***
–32.63***
–30.87***
Age
(5.45)
(6.11)
(6.38)
(7.95)
(6.44)
(7.28)
3.76
16.74
24.58
40.47**
52.72**
59.67**
LnIncome
(17.29)
(17.96)
(19.61)
(20.40)
(21.98)
(26.23)
–1.14
–1.65
–1.67
–2.27
–5.63
–5.64
Score
(3.07)
(3.29)
(3.35)
(3.71)
(3.54)
(3.82)
652.31**
574.76
489.91
440.10
822.75*
728.96
Intercept
(330.62)
(386.45)
(405.82)
(459.05)
(443.11)
(490.99)
Observations
114
94
89
80
67
47
R-squared
0.23
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.38
0.38
Note: “ALL OBS” stands for all observations. Each of subsequent models restricts the sample to bottom 𝑘 𝑡ℎ
percentile of the survey based Risk measure distribution, 𝑘 ∈ {90,80,70,60,50}. Numbers in the parentheses
represent standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively.
Condition

ALL OBS

Table A4: Treatment Marginal Effects with Categorized Risk in Experiment 1
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Dependent variable: Bribe
demand

OLS
Negative Binomial
Logit
(Continuous)
(Count)
(Binary)
–170.90***
–0.79***
–0.33**
LP Dummy
(41.30)
(0.17)
(0.13)
–30.58
–0.09
–0.18
HP Dummy
(46.57)
(0.17)
(0.14)
34.06**
0.17**
0.07*
Categorized Risk+
(15.31)
(0.07)
(0.04)
Gender
20.89
0.10
0.08
(1, if Female)
(35.73)
(0.16)
(0.09)
–17.31***
–0.09***
–0.03**
Age
(5.49)
(0.03)
(0.01)
Log of Monthly
4.75
0.01
–0.02
Family Income
(17.20)
(0.08)
(0.04)
–1.28
–0.01
0.01
Average Exam Score
(3.06)
(0.01)
(0.01)
662.60**
Intercept
(328.32)
R2 = 0.22
Wald χ2 = 30.03
Wald χ2 = 13.99
Note: Control treatment is used as the base treatment. For each model, N = 114. Robust standard errors are in the
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. + Categorized
Risk is defined as 1, 2, 3 and 4 for risk range 0-3, 4-6, 7-8, and 9-10, respectively.
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Table A5: Regression Results for Treatment Marginal Effects for Citizens in Experiment 1
Dependent
variable:
MBAC

OLS
(Continuous)

Negative
Binomial
(Count)
0.35
(0.23)
0.72***
(0.19)

Logit
(Binary)

Negative
Binomial
(Count)
0.37*
(0.22)
0.62***
(0.21)
–0.06**
(0.02)
–0.33**
(0.14)
0.03
(0.02)
0.17***
(0.05)
–0.01
(0.01)

Logit
(Binary)

67.98*
–0.04
(41.54)
(0.06)
121.26***
HP Dummy
.
.
(39.51)
–10.76**
–0.01
Risk
(4.92)
(0.01)
–68.51**
–0.05
Female
(30.07)
(0.05)
5.05
0.01
Age
(4.90)
(0.01)
33.77***
0.03*
LnIncome
(9.55)
(0.02)
–2.45
0.002
Score
(2.47)
(0.003)
347.37***
173.85
Intercept
(24.66)
(247.42)
N
114
114
76+
114
114
76+
R2 = 0.11
χ2 = 16.36
χ2 = 0.15
R2 = 0.26
χ2 = 44.26
χ2 = 6.47
Note: “MBAC” stands for maximum bribe acceptable to the Citizens. Control treatment is used as the base
treatment. Standard errors are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10%
level, respectively. + Each Citizen in HP was willing to pay a positive amount of bribe. In other words, the indicator
variable for HP predicts the binary dependent variable perfectly. As such, all observations from HP were dropped
from the regression results.
LP Dummy

63.16
(40.36)
136.84***
(33.15)

–0.03
(0.07)

OLS
(Continuous)
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Table A6: Regression Results for Treatment Marginal Effects in Experiment 2
Dependent
variable: Bribe
demand

OLS
(Continuous)

Logit
(Binary)
–0.19*
(0.12)
0.02
(0.12)

OLS
(Continuous)

Negative
Binomial
(Count)
–26.04
(45.77)
24.42
(39.62)
11.38
(11.96)
12.18
(37.25)
–2.88
(10.85)
–3.94
(15.42)
–0.47
(2.50)

Logit
(Binary)

–24.72
–0.16#
(46.48)
(0.11)
20.58
0.03
T2 Dummy
(42.33)
(0.12)
10.96
0.04
Risk
(12.38)
(0.03)
17.15
0.03
Female
(36.28)
(0.10)
–1.51
–0.01
Age
(11.56)
(0.03)
–1.52
0.01
LnIncome
(15.40)
(0.04)
–0.70
–0.00
Score
(2.77)
(0.01)
233.33***
258.36**
Intercept
(27.24)
(369.21)
2
2
2
R = 0.02
χ = 1.14
χ = 4.28
R2 = 0.03
χ2 = 2.13
χ2 = 5.68
Note: Control treatment is used as the base treatment. For each model, N = 95. Standard errors are in the parentheses.
***, **, * and # indicate significance at 1% level, 5% level, 10% level and 15% level, respectively. Given that we have
only around 30 observations in each treatment, the full model for likelihood of bribe demand, including all the
explanatory variables, does not have enough statistical power.
T1 Dummy

–33.33
(44.22)
16.67
(40.37)

Negative
Binomial
(Count)
–34.12
(43.99)
15.80
(38.30)

Table A7: Regression Results for Treatment Marginal Effects for Citizens in Experiment 2
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Dependent
variable:
MBAC

OLS
(Continuous)

Logit
(Binary)
0.10
(0.09)
-0.05
(0.08)

OLS
(Continuous)

Negative
Binomial
(Count)
-0.17
(0.16)
0.14
(0.11)
–0.02
(0.03)
–0.04
(0.11)
-0.08*
(0.04)
0.02
(0.05)
-0.00
(0.00)

Logit
(Binary)

-42.41
0.10
(41.75)
(0.08)
53.04
-0.04
HP Dummy
(34.73)
(0.07)
–3.09
0.02
Risk
(7.24)
(0.01)
–13.38
0.04
Female
(30.42)
(0.05)
-23.93**
0.02
Age
(11.24)
(0.01)
-0.62
-0.01
LnIncome
(14.96)
(0.02)
–0.09
0.01
Score
(0.09)
(<0.01)
320.00***
892.58
Intercept
(26.41)
(276.82)
N
95
95
95
95
95
95
R2 = 0.07
χ2 = 6.48
χ2 = 3.25
R2 = 0.13
χ2 = 65.84
χ2 = 8.36
Note: “MBAC” stands for maximum bribe acceptable to the Citizens. Control treatment is used as the base
treatment. Standard errors are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10%
level, respectively.
LP Dummy

-47.27
(39.93)
48.75
(34.50)

Negative
Binomial
(Count)
-0.16
(0.14)
0.14
(0.10)

Appendix 3: Supplementary material (for online publication only)
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(The instructions for low-probability-high-fine treatment (LP) are given below. For the highprobability-low-fine treatment (HP), we replaced the LP parameters with the HP parameters (see
Table 1). The instructions for control treatment (CTR) include Stages 1 and 2, but exclude Stage 3.
For Experiment 2, only the instructions for the control treatment were used. Though we used the
term fine in the main paper, when we ran the experiment we had used penalty in the Instruction.)

Instructions for All Participants
1.1 Introduction
Welcome to an experiment on decision making! If you read the following instructions
carefully, you can, depending on your decisions and the decisions of other participants, earn a
considerable amount of money. Communication with the other participants is strictly prohibited
during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and we will come to
you. This is an anonymous experiment and you will not know either the real identity of anyone
else or the choices they make. To facilitate payments, we have assigned a unique identity number
to each of you.
Earnings
During the experiment we will reward you in terms of a currency which we term as "Mohor".
All Mohors you earn in the experiment will be converted into (Indian) Rupee at the end of the
experiment. The conversion rate is: 1 Mohor = Rs 0.40. The amount of money you earn will
depend on your decisions as well as on the decisions other participants make.
Overview
The experiment consists of an interactive situation between two participants and a survey.
Please start by carefully reading the below instructions for the interactive situation. You will
receive the instructions for the survey at the end.
1.2 The Interactive Situation
Each of you is randomly matched with another participant seated in another room. Between the
two of you, one participant plays the role of a "Citizen", while the other participant plays the role
of a "Public Official". The three stages are described below.
Stage 1
First, the citizen performs a task. He/She is asked to count the number of occurrences of the
letter "A" from a random sequence of alphabets. For example, the number of occurrences of the
letter “A” in the sequence "DEWAABKACCQAJ" is 4. Five sequences will be provided, and a
citizen is asked to correctly count the number of occurrences of the letter “A” in at least three
sequences. Each citizen will have five minutes to complete the task.
If a citizen is unable to complete the task in five minutes, then the experiment ends, and the
citizen receives 400 Mohors for participation and the public official receives 1000 Mohors as
salary.
On the contrary, if the citizen is able to count (correctly or incorrectly) the number of “A”s in
at least three sequences in five minutes, then the citizen’s answers will be graded by the matched
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public official. If the public official determines that the citizen did not correctly solve at least
three sequences, then the experiment ends, and the citizen receives 400 Mohors for participation
and the public official receives 1000 Mohors as salary. On the contrary, if the public official
determines that the citizen has correctly solved at least three sequences, then the citizen not only
receives 400 Mohors for participation, but he/she wins an additional prize of 600 Mohors, and
the experiment moves to Stage 2.
Stage 2
As indicated above, the experiment moves to Stage 2 when a public official determines that
the matched citizen has won a prize of 600 Mohors, by correctly solving the at least three
sequences. However, the citizen will receive the prize only when the public official approves the
prize. The public official will now make ONE of two following choices:
(a) Approve the citizen's prize, OR
(b) Demand a bribe in return for approving the citizen's prize.
If the public official chooses to approve the citizen's prize (choice (a)), the experiment ends,
in which case the citizen receives the prize of 600 Mohors plus the participation fee of 400
Mohors and the public official receives 1000 Mohors as salary. If a public official chooses to
demand a bribe (choice (b)), then he/she must also indicate the amount of bribe he/she is asking
for. The public official may ask for a bribe of either 200 Mohors, or 400 Mohors, or 600 Mohors.
If a public official chooses to demand a bribe in return for approving the citizen's prize
(choice (b)), then the citizen will make ONE of two following choices:
(i) Accept the demand for bribe, OR
(ii) Reject the demand for bribe. prize.
If the citizen rejects (choice (ii)), then the citizen receives only the participation fee (and not
the prize) and the public official receives 1000 Mohors as salary (and not the bribe). If the citizen
accepts (choice (i)), then the game goes to Stage 3.
Stage 3
In Stage 3, which we call the Audit stage, there is a 20% chance that an audit will be conducted
on a public official. Thus, the audit is randomly conducted and you do not know in advance who
will be audited and who will not. If an audited person is found to demand bribe then a fine is
imposed on him. Please take a look at the table below to see what the fine amounts are.
If a public official is caught having demanded a bribe (chance 20%) then a fine P is imposed
on his earning. Public Official earns (1000 – Penalty) Mohors and Citizen earns 1000 Mohors. If
he is not audited (chance 80%) then he earns (1000 + Bribe) Mohors and the citizen earns (1000
– Bribe) Mohors.
Bribe amount
(in Mohors)
200
400
600

Chance of NOT
facing an audit
80%
80%
80%

Chance of facing an
audit
20%
20%
20%
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Penalty
(in Mohors)
300
600
900
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Instructions for Citizens

Registration Number: JU2016C

Each of you in this room has been assigned the role of a Citizen. Each of you has been
matched with another participant (seated in another room), who has been assigned the role of a
Public Official.
What you need to do
Please read the questions below and write your answers in the space provided. Your answers will
be matched with the Public Official you are paired with and both of earnings will be determined.
Question 1 for Citizen (The Task): Please count, within five minutes, the number of times the
letter “A” appears in the five sequences. Please record your answers in the blank spaces
provided. Note that in order to win the prize of 600 Mohors, a citizen’s answers must be correct
for at least three sequences. You will be provided the task on a separate sheet.
Question 2 for Citizen: Read the example below. After that, fill in the blanks for 2(A)-2(C). To
follow the example, quiz and subsequent earnings below is the table which shows the chances of
facing the audit for you and the fine involved.
Bribe amount
(in Mohors)
200
400
600

Chance of NOT
facing an audit
80%
80%
80%

Chance of
facing an audit
20%
20%
20%

Penalty for Public Official
(in Mohors)
300
600
900

Example: Suppose you successfully complete the task and win the prize of 600 Mohors.
However, the public official (PO) demands a bribe of 400 Mohors to approve the prize. You
accept to pay the bribe. Now, at the audit stage, the PO is audited (chance of which is 20%) and
he/she is caught having demanded bribe. In that case, you will receive (400 + 600) = 1000
Mohors. Since there is a 600 Mohors fine for demanding a bribe of 400 Mohors, the PO will
receive 1000 – 600 (penalty amount from the above table) = 400 Mohors. On the contrary, if
you reject the bribe demand, then you get 400 Mohors (Participation fee only) and the public
official gets 1000 Mohors.
In the same manner, if the PO had demanded a bribe of 600 Mohors and he/she was caught in
the audit stage, then he/she would have received (1000 – 900) = 100 Mohors.
Quiz: Suppose you successfully complete the task and win the prize of 600 Mohors.
However, the public official demands a bribe of 600 Mohors to approve the prize. You accept to
pay it.
A) At the audit stage the PO is not caught (chance of which is ________________%).
Your earning is ________________. The Public Official's earning is _____________.
B) Now suppose that at the audit stage PO is caught (chance of which is ________%).
The public official gets __________________. Your earning is _____________.
C) Suppose you reject to pay the bribe.
PO’s earning is ____________________.
Your earning is ____________________.
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Question 3 for Citizen: If you believe you have successfully completed the task, please indicate
how much bribe you think will be demanded from you by the public official. Think carefully
before mentioning what you think the public official will do. You will receive an additional 25
Mohors if your answer matches with what the public official’s decision.
I think the public official will (Please underline any ONE of the four choices below):
•

Approve the prize

•

Demand a bribe of 200 Mohors

•

Demand a bribe of 400 Mohors

•

Demand a bribe of 600 Mohors

Question 4 for Citizen
If the public official indeed demands any of the bribe amounts (200 Mohors or 400 Mohors or
600 Mohors), then you need to decide whether you accept the demand or reject the demand. If
you reject, you will receive 400 Mohors as participation fee and the public official will receive
1000 Mohors as salary. If you accept, you will receive (400 Mohors + 600 Mohors – bribe) and
the public official will receive either (1000 Mohors + bribe) or (1000 Mohors – penalty),
depending on whether the public official is caught during the audit or not. Please give your
decision Accept or Reject for each bribe demand.
Your Earning if you Accept
Amount of Bribe
and the PO is
Demanded (in Mohors) the Demand
not caught
200

1000 – 200 = 800

400

1000 – 400 = 600

600

1000 – 600 = 400

Your decision
(Write Accept or Reject)

If you are done, please submit this worksheet to the experimenter. We will now conduct the audit
stage with Public Officials.
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Instructions for Public Officials

Registration Number: JU2016P

Each of you in this room has been assigned the role of a Public Official. Each of you has
been matched with another participant (seated in another room), who has been assigned the role
of a Citizen.
What you need to do
Please read the questions below and write your answers in the space provided. Your answers will
be matched with the answers of the citizen you are paired with and thereby your earnings will be
determined.
Question 1 for Public Official: Read the example below. Then, fill in the blanks for 1(a)-1(d).
Example: Suppose the citizen successfully completes the task and win the prize of 600
Mohors. However, you (public official) demand a bribe of 400 Mohors to approve the prize. The
citizen accepts to pay the bribe. An audit (chance of which is 20%) in stage three reveals that
you have demanded a bribe. In that case, the citizen will receive (400 + 600) = 1000 Mohors.
Since there is a 600 Mohors fine for demanding a bribe of 400 Mohors (consult the table below),
you will receive 1000 – 600 (penalty amount from the table) = 400 Mohors. On the contrary, if
the citizen rejects the bribe demand, the citizen receives 400 Mohors (Participation fee only) and
you receive 1000 Mohors.
In the same manner, if you had demanded a bribe of 600 Mohors and the audit stage revealed
that, then you would have received (1000 – 900) = 100 Mohors.
Quiz: Suppose the citizen successfully completes the task and win the prize of 600 Mohors.
However, you demand a bribe of 600 Mohors to approve the prize. The citizen accepts to pay it.
D) At the audit stage you are not caught (chance of which is _____________%).
The citizen's earning is _____________. Your earning is ________________.
E) Now suppose audit reveals you demanded bribe (chance of which is ________%).
The citizen's earning is _____________. Your earning is ________________.
F) Suppose the citizen rejects to pay the bribe.
The citizen's earning is _____________. Your earning is ________________.
Instruction for Public Official: Please respond to the questions below.
Please take a look at the citizen’s answers and compare those answers with the answer-key
provided to you. Are the citizen’s answers correct (for at least three sequences)? Please
underline any ONE of the two choices:
YES

NO
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Question 2 for Public Official
If you have underlined “YES”, then the citizen has won the prize. Would you now like to
approve the prize or demand a bribe? Take a look at the table below and after that, please
underline any ONE of the four choices that follow.
Bribe amount
(in Mohors)
200
400
600

Chance of NOT
facing an audit
80%
80%
80%

•

Approve the prize

•

Demand a bribe of 200 Mohors

•

Demand a bribe of 400 Mohors

•

Demand a bribe of 600 Mohors

Chance of
facing an audit
20%
20%
20%

Penalty for Public Official
(in Mohors)
300
600
900

Question 3 for Public Official
Please mention whether you think the citizen will accept/reject your bribe demand. You will
receive an additional 25 Mohors if your answer matches with the citizen’s decision (please put a
tick mark against your choice).
•

Suppose you demand a bribe of 200 Mohors: Citizen will Accept / Reject it.

•

Suppose you demand a bribe of 400 Mohors: Citizen will Accept / Reject it.

•

Suppose you demand a bribe of 600 Mohors: Citizen will Accept / Reject it.

Question 4 for Public Official: A few minutes back, you graded the citizen’s task using the
answer-key. Therefore, you now know whether the citizen has successfully completed the task.
However, the citizen does not yet know whether he/she successfully completed the task. Assume
that the citizen believes that he/she has completed the task successfully, i.e., the citizen believes
that his/her answers for at least three sequences are correct.
If the citizen believes that he/she has successfully completed the task to win the prize, then
he/she may start thinking whether you (the public official) will approve the prize or demand a
bribe. Please indicate how much bribe the Citizen believes you will ask for. Think carefully
before mentioning what you think the citizen believes you will do. You will receive an additional
25 Mohors if your answer matches with the citizen’s belief.

62

I think the citizen believes that I will (Please underline any ONE of the four choices below):
Approve the
prize

Demand a bribe
of 200 Mohors

Demand a bribe
of 400 Mohors

Demand a bribe
of 600 Mohors

Audit Stage
At stage three, the chance that you will be audited is 20%. To figure out whether you will be
audited or not, please write any number between 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 in the space given
below. After we collect our answer sheets, we will throw a ten sided dice. Chance of occurrence
of any one number is 10%. We will throw the dice twice to randomly obtain two numbers. If
your chosen number happens to be one of the two randomly chosen numbers then you will be
audited. In this way we ensure that the chance of you being audited is 20%.
Question 5 for Public Official: My choice of number is _______________ (any number
between 1 and 10, including 1 and 10). If you write any other number, your entire earnings will
be taken away.
Please hand in the response sheets now. We will now randomly throw the ten sided dice to figure
out whether you will be audited.
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